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Preface & Acknowledgements  
During his internship with the Graduate School of Business & Public Policy in June 
2010, U.S. Air Force Academy Cadet Chase Lane surveyed the activities of the Naval 
Postgraduate School’s Acquisition Research Program in its first seven years.  The sheer 
volume of research products—almost 600 published papers (e.g., technical reports, journal 
articles, theses)—indicates the extent to which the depth and breadth of acquisition 
research has increased during these years.  Over 300 authors contributed to these works, 
which means that the pool of those who have had significant intellectual engagement with 
acquisition issues has increased substantially.  The broad range of research topics includes 
acquisition reform, defense industry, fielding, contracting, interoperability, organizational 
behavior, risk management, cost estimating, and many others.  Approaches range from 
conceptual and exploratory studies to develop propositions about various aspects of 
acquisition, to applied and statistical analyses to test specific hypotheses.  Methodologies 
include case studies, modeling, surveys, and experiments.  On the whole, such findings 
make us both grateful for the ARP’s progress to date, and hopeful that this progress in 
research will lead to substantive improvements in the DoD’s acquisition outcomes. 
As pragmatists, we of course recognize that such change can only occur to the 
extent that the potential knowledge wrapped up in these products is put to use and tested to 
determine its value.  We take seriously the pernicious effects of the so-called “theory–
practice” gap, which would separate the acquisition scholar from the acquisition practitioner, 
and relegate the scholar’s work to mere academic “shelfware.”  Some design features of our 
program that we believe help avoid these effects include the following: connecting 
researchers with practitioners on specific projects; requiring researchers to brief sponsors on 
project findings as a condition of funding award; “pushing” potentially high-impact research 
reports (e.g., via overnight shipping) to selected practitioners and policy-makers; and most 
notably, sponsoring this symposium, which we craft intentionally as an opportunity for 
fruitful, lasting connections between scholars and practitioners. 
A former Defense Acquisition Executive, responding to a comment that academic 
research was not generally useful in acquisition practice, opined, “That’s not their [the 
academics’] problem—it’s ours [the practitioners’].  They can only perform research; it’s up 
to us to use it.”  While we certainly agree with this sentiment, we also recognize that any 
research, however theoretical, must point to some termination in action; academics have a 
responsibility to make their work intelligible to practitioners.  Thus we continue to seek 
projects that both comport with solid standards of scholarship, and address relevant 
acquisition issues.  These years of experience have shown us the difficulty in attempting to 
balance these two objectives, but we are convinced that the attempt is absolutely essential if 
any real improvement is to be realized. 
We gratefully acknowledge the ongoing support and leadership of our sponsors, 
whose foresight and vision have assured the continuing success of the Acquisition 
Research Program:  
• Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology & Logistics) 
• Program Executive Officer SHIPS 
• Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command 
• Army Contracting Command, U.S. Army Materiel Command 
• Program Manager, Airborne, Maritime and Fixed Station Joint Tactical Radio System 
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• Program Executive Officer Integrated Warfare Systems 
• Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Acquisition) 
• Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics, & Technology) 
• Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Acquisition & Logistics Management) 
• Director, Strategic Systems Programs Office 
• Deputy Director, Acquisition Career Management, US Army 
• Defense Business Systems Acquisition Executive, Business Transformation Agency  
• Office of Procurement and Assistance Management Headquarters, Department of 
Energy 
 
We also thank the Naval Postgraduate School Foundation and acknowledge its 
generous contributions in support of this Symposium.  
 
 
James B. Greene, Jr.     Keith F. Snider, PhD 
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Abstract 
Private companies rely on cash raised from capital markets to finance their 
operations, including expenditures on long-term assets (such as facilities and 
equipment), independent research and development (IRAD), and retirement of old 
debt. Capital markets play a role in shaping the depth and breadth of the U.S. 
defense industry and the capabilities it has to offer, as well as in the cost of these 
capabilities to the Department of Defense. 
This paper presents interim findings of research on defense companies’ access to 
capital markets. The research is ongoing, and a final version, including policy 
recommendations, will be presented at the May 2012 Naval Postgraduate School 
Annual Acquisition Symposium. 
Introduction 
In its FY2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), the Department of Defense 
(DoD) recognized the importance of the investment community to the well-being of the 
defense industry. Specifically, the QDR emphasized the importance of access to capital to 
the defense industry’s health, stating that “the Department must ensure that we do not take 
this access to capital for granted and must work to form a more transparent view of our 
requirements and long-term investment plans” (DoD, 2010). 
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Industry executives voice similar concerns. In a newspaper interview, the chief 
financial officer of a large private firm with a significant defense business said that “the core 
issue [for defense companies] is the difficulty in matching the heavy demands of customers 
against the ambitious financial returns expected by investors” (Michaels, 2010). 
Capital markets are composed of a wide variety of investors with an even wider array 
of investment objectives and strategies. This analysis focuses on two key elements of 
capital markets: the equity and bond markets. Equity investors invest money in a company 
in return for a claim on the company’s profits, proportionate to the number of shares they 
own as a percent of total shares. Bond investors lend money to a company for a specific 
period at a specific interest rate. Unlike shareholders, who have a claim on the company’s 
profits, lenders are entitled to receive the same payment every period until all the principal 
and interest are repaid. Lenders (debt) and owners (equity) have different claims on a 
company. Nevertheless, decisions about which companies to invest in, and for what level of 
return, are derived from the same set of accounting, financial, and risk fundamentals. 
This research paper analyzes the attractiveness of the U.S. defense industry to 
capital markets based on financial metrics, including profitability, cashflows, and liquidity, as 
well as relative market valuation. The aim is to provide quantitative evidence on the financial 
health of the defense industry, both historically and compared to the broader commercial 
market. 
Methodology 
This research paper is divided into three valuation categories: profitability, liquidity, 
and market relative valuation. While these categories are by no means exhaustive, they 
contain fundamental data regarding companies’ financials that are of interest to existing and 
potential investors. The study focuses on metrics that are capital structure neutral and thus 
relevant for both equity owners and debt holders. The data are taken from commercial 
databases and companies’ financial reports. The analysis also draws upon interviews with 
Wall Street analysts and buy-side investment professionals. 
To examine and assess the financial performance of the defense sector, and to 
capture the diversity of companies within it, the Defense-Industrial Initiatives Group (DIIG) 
created the CSIS Defense Index. The CSIS Defense Index is composed of 32 public 
companies with annual revenue ranging from $180 million to $45 billion, representing not 
only hardware and equipment firms, but also the professional services sector. The CSIS 
Defense Index includes a number of legacy defense firms, as well as foreign companies 
with significant presence in the U.S. defense market. In choosing companies for the CSIS 
Defense Index, DIIG focused on publicly traded firms with a preponderance of revenue from 
military-use products and services. At times, the inclusion of a given company depended on 
the availability of financial data. See Appendix A for a list of companies.  
The analysis of the CSIS Defense Index is twofold. First, the CSIS Defense Index is 
benchmarked against the components of the S&P 500 (excluding financial and defense 
firms) and the industrial components of the S&P 1500 (excluding defense firms). Second, 
the CSIS Defense Index is broken down into subcategories that are measured against their 
respective commercial counterparts. 
Recognizing the diversity of companies in the CSIS Defense Index, the DIIG team 
divided the index into three sub-indices: CSIS Defense Professional Services (DPS) Sub-
Index; CSIS Hardware & Equipment (H&E) Sub-Index; and the CSIS Diversified Sub-Index. 
The CSIS DPS Sub-Index is composed of companies whose majority of revenue derives 
from services. The CSIS H&E Sub-Index is composed of companies whose majority of 
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revenue derives from manufacturing. The CSIS Diversified Sub-Index is composed of 
companies with significant revenue from both defense professional services and 
manufacturing.  
To evaluate the performance of the sub-indices of the CSIS Defense Index, the 
research team identified comparable commercial companies from the S&P 1500 Index. 
CSIS used Standard & Poor’s Global Industry Classification Standards (GICS) to sort the 
S&P 1500 by sectors, industry groups, industries, and sub-industries. This breakdown 
allowed the research team to identify commercial companies with comparable business mix 
to those of the sub-indices of the CSIS Defense Index. Of the comparable companies 
identified, the research team excluded companies whose most recent three-year average 
revenue exceeded or fell below the range of the three-year average revenue of the CSIS 
sub-index they were to benchmark. The three benchmarks are as follows: Commercial & 
Professional Services; Commercial Hardware & Equipment; and Commercial Diversified. 
The Commercial & Professional Services benchmark includes companies from GICS 
Industry Group 2020 Commercial and Professional Services, including diversified support 
services, environmental and facilities services, office services and supplies, security and 
alarm services, human resources and employment services, and research and consulting 
services. DIIG also chose to include information technology services companies from GICS 
Industry 451020 IT Consulting & Other Services in order to ensure a comprehensive 
comparison of its CSIS DPS Index counterpart. 
The Commercial Hardware & Equipment benchmark is composed of companies 
whose majority of revenue derives from manufacturing. It includes companies from three 
GICS industries: Technology Hardware and Equipment (4520), specializing, among other 
things, in electronics manufacturing and communications equipment; Construction & Farm 
Machinery (201060), specializing in the design and manufacturing of premium light-, 
medium-, and heavy-duty trucks; and Electrical Components & Equipment (201040), 
specializing in electrical, electromechanical, and electronic products.  
Finally, the research team employed a slightly different methodology in selecting a 
commercial benchmark for the CSIS Diversified Sub-Index. The unique nature of the 
companies in the CSIS Diversified Sub-Index, encompassing both products and services, 
did not allow for a parallel comparison to a GICS category. As a result, DIIG identified six 
companies with a comparable size profile (by revenue) to the six companies in the CSIS 
Diversified Sub-Index. Three of the companies are manufacturers and the other three are 
services companies. The result is a Commercial Diversified benchmark, whose total revenue 
is split nearly evenly among services and manufacturing, thus mimicking the profiles of 
companies within the CSIS Diversified Index. For a list of benchmark companies, see 
Appendix B. 
It is important to note that the following analysis aggregates financial data for a large 
number of companies over a period of 20 years. This posed a challenge in standardizing the 
data across companies and across time. The research team had to apply substantial 
judgment regarding extreme data points, which may result from an extraordinary, one-time 
charge for any given company. Nevertheless, the trends seen in the following analysis are 
indicative of the performance of the defense industry over the period evaluated, and 
compared to the broader economy. It provides an analytical foundation for understanding 
the financial health of the defense industry and its attractiveness to capital markets. 
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Data Presentation & Analysis 
Profitability 
Defense firms perform a distinctive function in providing the U.S. military with state-
of-the-art equipment and services to carry out its missions. They are also, however, like 
other private-sector companies in that they exist to earn money for their owners, the 
shareholders. In fact, increasing returns to shareholders is among the most important 
priorities for the CEO of any company, including any defense company. Profitability metrics 
are equally important to equity owners and debt holders. 
Operating profit margin is the ratio of operating income to revenue. It measures the 
leftover portion of a company’s revenue after paying for variable costs of production such as 
raw materials, direct labor, and internal research and development, to name a few. The 
higher the margin, the lower the risk a company will default on its interest and income tax 
obligations. Generally, higher margin also means that more income is left for shareholders. 
Figure 1 compares operating profit margin for the CSIS Defense, S&P 500, and S&P 
1500 Industrial Indices between 1990 and 2010. While the CSIS Defense Index’s operating 
margin is higher today than at any point in the past 20 years, it has consistently been lower 
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CSIS Defense Index S&P 1500 Industrials S&P 500   
Figure 1. Operating Margin Comparison, CSIS Defense Index and Commercial 
Benchmarks, 1990–2010 
Note. The source for this figure was Bloomberg, and the analysis was by CSIS Defense-
Industrial Initiatives Group. 
Figure 2 compares operating profit margin for each of the CSIS Defense sub-indices 
and their commercial benchmarks. Operating margins for all of the defense sub-indices 
have been lower than those of their commercial benchmarks. The drop in margin for the 
CSIS DPS Sub-Index in 2005 likely reflects increased competition as large defense primes 
entered the professional services market. 
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Figure 2. Operating Margin Comparison, Defense Sub-Indices and Commercial 
Benchmarks, 1990–2010 
Note. The source for this figure was Bloomberg, and the analysis was by CSIS Defense-
Industrial Initiatives Group. 
In their 2010 fourth-quarter earnings calls with investment analysts, most industry 
executives held optimistic views on margin growth for 2011. These views, however, do not 
fully account for a full-year Continuing Resolution, which has already begun to impact 
contracts, production ramp-ups, and backlogs.  
The consensus among Aerospace & Defense equity research teams at the large 
investment banks is that operating profit margins for most defense contractors, and 
specifically for prime contractors, peaked in 2008. While it is unlikely that margins will fall 
back to their 1990s levels, they are likely to stabilize at the 8–9% range for the foreseeable 
future. 
Cash flow return on investment (CFROI) is another important profitability metric. It is 
a measurement of the cash flow available after expenses have been paid and sufficient 
investment has been made to continue current operations. Figure 3 shows CFROI for the 
CSIS Defense, S&P 500, and S&P 1500 Industrial Indices between 1994 and 2010. By this 
measure of profitability, CSIS Defense Index companies have generated, on average, 
higher returns than the broader market for the period. The spike in CFROI between 2007 
 =
=




and 2010 is attributed to strong free cash flow generation (numerator), as well as shrinking 
capital base (denominator) due in part to debt retirement and share repurchase.1 
 
Figure 3. CFROI Comparison, CSIS Defense Index and Commercial Benchmarks, 
1990–2010 
Note. The source for this figure was Bloomberg, and the analysis was by CSIS Defense-
Industrial Initiatives Group. 
Figure 4 compares CFROI for the CSIS Defense sub-indices and the commercial 
benchmarks. This level of analysis shows a different picture than the previous figure. The 
CSIS H&E Sub-Index is the only sub-index whose CFROI levels are on par with its 
commercial benchmark. The CSIS DPS Sub-Index surpassed its commercial benchmark in 
2008, at the peak of the current defense cycle. The CSIS Diversified Sub-Index, although 
trailing its commercial benchmark closely since 2004, has remained historically lower. 
                                                
1 To arrive at cash flow, we used EBIT plus depreciation and amortization minus capital expenditures minus the 
increase in net working capital, which in turn is the sum of accounts receivable and inventory, minus accounts 
payable. Investment is the sum of long- and short-term debt and shareholders’ equity (including preferred stock). 
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Figure 4. CFROI Comparison, Defense Sub-Indices and Commercial Benchmarks, 
2001–2010 
Note. The source for this figure was Bloomberg, and the analysis was by CSIS Defense-
Industrial Initiatives Group. 
The dynamic between profit margin and CFROI is unique to the defense business 
model and is important to understand. Defense firms are subject to a form of cost-based 
profit regulations, broadly referred to as the DoD’s “profit policy.” Two aspects of the DoD’s 
profit policy are of particular interest: the weighted guidelines and contract finance. 
The DoD’s profit policy is governed by the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation 
Supplement (DFARS) section 215.404.  The rules, collectively known as the weighted 
guidelines, are composed of four pieces: performance risk, contract risk, facilities capital, 
and working capital. Each component (and subcomponent) has a “base” profit value, to 
which a contracting officer may add a percentage based on a preset range. The level of 
profit or fee a contract is awarded—as a percentage of cost—is based on the amount and 
type of risk assumed by the contractor. Generally, the lower the risk borne by the contractor, 
the lower the profit is as a percentage of total cost. 
Contract finance is used to fund contractors’ working capital during the development 
and production of products unique to the military. Contract finance is necessary due to the 
long acquisition cycle and the high level of uncertainty associated with military technology. 
Contract finance—or progress payment—is periodic payments to the contractor for the 
portion of the work completed and includes a share of the profit, or fee. Consequently, 
contractors use less of their own working capital over the life of a program. 
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A study published by the Institute for Defense Analyses on the DoD’s profit policy 
concludes that because defense firms use less of their own money to finance programs, 
they may receive lower margins and still have high returns (Arnold et al., 2009). In effect, 
margins and CFROI are the opposite side of the same coin. Investors have been willing to 
accept lower profit margins from defense firms, in comparison with other investment 
opportunities, in exchange for higher cash flows. 
Liquidity 
Liquidity ratios are used by investors to determine companies’ ability to meet their 
short-term financial obligations with their short-term assets. Debt holders usually seek higher 
liquidity multiples to ensure that a firm will not default on its obligations. Shareholders 
generally prefer lower liquidity multiples because they prefer more of their money to be at 
work, generating returns. The DIIG research team focuses on three liquidity ratios, 
representing a mix of cash flow statement and balance sheet metrics. 
 
Figure 5. Current Ratio Comparison, CSIS Defense Index and Commercial 
Benchmarks, 1990–2010 
Note. The source for this figure was Bloomberg, and the analysis was by CSIS Defense-
Industrial Initiatives Group. 
The current ratio is the ratio of a firm’s current assets to its current liabilities. Current 
assets are the sum of cash and cash equivalents, marketable securities, accounts and notes 
receivable, and inventories. Current liabilities are the sum of accounts payable, short-term 
debt, and other short-term liabilities. A current ratio greater or equal to 1 implies that a 
company is able to meet its current obligations with its current assets. 
The current ratio of the CSIS Defense Index has been relatively constant during the 
period and slightly below the commercial indices in the past decade.  
Figure 6 depicts the current ratio multiples of the CSIS Defense Sub-Indices and 
their commercial benchmarks. Among the defense sub-indices, the CSIS DPS Sub-Index 
has had the highest current ratio, with short-term assets at about 1.5–2 times its current 
liabilities for the period. The DPS Sub-Index is also the only defense sub-index whose 
current ratio exceeds that of its commercial benchmark. 
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Figure 6. Current Ratio Comparison, Defense Sub-Indices and Commercial 
Benchmarks, 1990–2010 
Note. The source for this figure was Bloomberg, and the analysis was by CSIS Defense-
Industrial Initiatives Group. 
The quick ratio is considered to be more conservative than the current ratio because 
it excludes inventories from a company’s current assets. The rationale behind this is that 
inventories are harder to convert into cash in a relatively short period of time to cover short-
term financial obligations. This assumption holds true for defense companies, given the fact 
that they operate in a near monopsony market while their main customer, the Department of 
Defense, operates on a preset procurement schedule.  
Figure 7 compares the quick ratio for the CSIS Defense, S&P 500, and S&P 1500 
Industrial Indices between 1990 and 2010. Once inventories are excluded from the current 
assets, the liquidity of defense firms drops significantly.  It appears that by this measure of 









Figure 7. Quick Ratio Comparison, CSIS Defense Index and Commercial 
Benchmarks, 1990–2010 
Note. The source for this figure was Bloomberg, and the analysis was by CSIS Defense-
Industrial Initiatives Group. 
Figure 8 depicts the quick ratio multiples of the CSIS Defense sub-indices and their 
commercial benchmarks. Again, the CSIS DPS Sub-Index companies are the only 
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Figure 8. Quick Ratio Comparison, Defense Sub-Indices and Commercial 
Benchmarks, 1990–2010 
Note. The source for this figure was Bloomberg, and the analysis was by CSIS Defense-
Industrial Initiatives Group. 
By this measure of liquidity, defense professional services companies are the most 
liquid among the defense sub-indices, as well as compared to their commercial benchmarks. 
It is important to note, however, that services firms rarely carry any inventories, which 
explains the similarities between the current and quick ratios for services companies.  
While liquidity multiples for defense companies appear to be lower than those of their 
commercial benchmarks, defense firms do enjoy a special relationship with their customer, 
the DoD. As mentioned in the previous section, defense contractors receive advance 
payments on work done even before the work is completed.  
The cash flow to debt multiple measures a company’s operating cash flow to its total 
debt and is used to determine a company’s ability to repay its debt, specifically with 
operating cash flow.  The higher the cash flow to debt multiple, the more attractive a 
company is to investors.  
Figure 9 compares the cash flow to debt ratio of the CSIS Defense, S&P 500, and 
S&P 1500 Industrial Indices between 1990 and 2010. The cash flow to debt multiples for the 
CSIS Defense Index was below that of the commercial indices throughout the 1990s and 
has climbed with defense budgets beginning in 2002. The strong cash flow to debt multiples 
in the 2000s are likely due to a mix of strong cash flows and lower debt levels, specifically a 
reduction in short-term debt toward the end of the period. As defense budgets begin to 
subside, expectations are that the ratio will decrease again.  
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Figure 9. Cash Flow to Debt Comparison, CSIS Defense Index and Commercial 
Benchmarks, 1990–2010 
Note. The source for this figure was Bloomberg, and the analysis was by CSIS Defense-
Industrial Initiatives Group. 
Figure 10 compares the operation cash flow to debt ratio for the CSIS Defense sub-
indices and their commercial benchmarks. Both the CSIS DPS and Diversified Indices’ ratios 
are relatively on par with their commercial benchmarks. The CSIS H&E Sub-Index’s 
multiples are slightly lower than those of its commercial benchmark. As defense budgets 
begin to subside, expectations are that this ratio will again decrease for defense firms. 
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Figure 10. Cash Flow to Debt Comparison, Defense Sub-Indices and Commercial 
Benchmarks, 1990–2010 
Note. The source for this figure was Bloomberg, and the analysis was by CSIS Defense-
Industrial Initiatives Group. 
Relative Market Valuation  
The following analysis examines investors’ sentiment based on price and enterprise 
value multiples. The analysis indicates how markets are pricing a security, or an industry, 
both historically and relative to commercial benchmarks.  
Figure 11 shows the percentage change in share price for the S&P 500, S&P 500 
Aerospace & Defense, and the Spade Defense Indices.2 From 2001 until the stock-market 
peak in 2007, the Aerospace & Defense indices outperformed the S&P 500 Index. This 
trend was particularly pronounced from March 2003 until late 2007, the period that saw the 
most intense fighting in Iraq. From 2007 to 2008, the indices have traded closely together, 
as investors began anticipating the end of U.S. involvement in Iraq and slower growth in the 
defense budget. The plunge in the Spade Defense Index in 2008 likely reflects broader 
investor flight from equity rather than a fundamental change in the financial health of the 
defense sector. 
                                                









Figure 11. Index Price Performance, 1999–2010 (1999 = 100) 
Note. The source for this figure was Bloomberg, and the analysis was by CSIS Defense-
Industrial Initiatives Group. 
Figure 12 shows the percentage price change from April 30, 2010, to January 31, 
2011,3 for the same indices depicted in Figure 9. From April 2010 to date, the S&P 500 
outperformed the Aerospace & Defense indices, continuing the trends from 2008. The price 
rally in the Aerospace & Defense indices beginning in August 2010 coincides with a rally in 
the broader market. Note that Secretary Robert Gates and Under Secretary Ashton Carter’s 
Efficiency Initiatives have done little to alter share price performance of defense companies. 
One explanation is that by September 2010, markets already anticipated significant cuts in 
defense outlays, disregarding Secretary Gates’ promise for a 1% real growth in the base 
budgets over the FY2011–FY2015 FYDP. 
 
Figure 12. Index Price Performance, April 2010–March 2011 (April 30, 2010 = 100 
Note. The source for this figure was Bloomberg, and the analysis was by CSIS Defense-
Industrial Initiatives Group. 
                                                
3 The May 2010 date was selected because of Secretary Robert Gates’ speeches at the Navy League and the 
Eisenhower Library, which mark the beginning of the DoD’s Efficiency Initiatives.  
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The price to earnings (P/E) ratio is another important indication of investor sentiment. 
The P/E multiple is the ratio of the current price of a stock and a company’s earnings per 
share (EPS).4 The DIIG research team used next year’s EPS, based on analysts’ estimates. 
The P/E multiple shows how much investors are willing to pay today for every dollar of profit 
next year and, more importantly, investor expectation of the company’s growth prospect. In 
other words, P/E multiples already account for future expected growth and thus investor 
sentiment for the future prospect of the company or industry. If investors are optimistic about 
an industry, its P/E ratio will be above that of its benchmark and vice versa. 
Figure 13 shows average forward P/E multiples for the CSIS Defense Index relative 
to the S&P 500 Index.  
From the second half of 2004 through the second half of 2008, the period that saw 
the most intense fighting in Iraq, defense stocks have traded at a premium to the S&P 500. 
By 2008, investors became pessimistic regarding future growth prospects in the defense 
market, as most analysts began anticipating the end of the war in Iraq and slower-growing 
defense budgets. From 2009 through 2010, the CSIS Defense Index P/E increased, most 
likely the result of smaller than expected cuts in defense spending as well as increased 
confidence in the U.S. economic recovery. 
 
Figure 13. Forward Relative Price Earning, CSIS Defense Index Average 
Note. The source for this figure was Bloomberg, and the analysis was by CSIS Defense-
Industrial Initiatives Group. 
The Enterprise Value (EV) to Earnings before Interest, Taxes, Depreciation, and 
Amortization (EBITDA) is another widely used multiple to determine how companies or 
industries are valued. Enterprise value is the sum of market capitalization, preferred equity, 
minority interest, short- and long-term debt minus cash and equivalent. Market capitalization 
is the product of current share price and number of shares outstanding. Unlike the P/E ratio, 
the EV/EBITDA is capital neutral, meaning that the multiple also accounts for the company’s 
debt. As Figure 14 shows, defense firms are valued at a discount to the broader S&P 500 by 
this measure.  
                                                
4 Earnings per share from continuing operations before one-time, extraordinary items. 
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Figure 14. EV to EBITDA Comparison, CSIS Defense and S&P 500 Indices, 2000–
2010 
Note. The source for this figure was Bloomberg, and the analysis was by CSIS Defense-
Industrial Initiatives Group. 
Summary & Conclusions 
The analysis above focuses on three valuation categories: profitability, liquidity, and 
relative market valuation. Although by no means exhaustive, these metrics are most 
commonly used by financial analysts and are indicative of defense firms’ performance, both 
historically and compared to commercial peers. The trend analysis shows that CSIS 
Defense Index performance largely trailed its commercial benchmarks, with the CFROI as 
the only exception. The trends persisted when the components of the CSIS Defense Index 
were divided according to business specialization. The analysis of the CSIS Defense sub-
indices also showed that the industry is not monolithic, as the performance of each of the 
sub-indices varied from one another. 
The main concern for investors and the DoD is that as defense budgets begin to fall 
in real terms, as they usually do after a protracted growth period, defense financials, and 
consequently their market valuation, could further deteriorate. If this happens, defense firms 
could find capital markets less accessible or, alternatively, could see their cost of capital 
increase, since debt investors will demand higher interest payments to compensate for the 
increased risk. 
The consensus among Wall Street analysts is that the relatively favorable “terms of 
trade” the industry enjoyed in the past decade are giving way to a more austere spending 
environment.  Expectations are that defense operating margins have peaked in 2008 and 
will likely stabilize at the 8–9% range for the foreseeable future. 
Future Research 
The final section of this research project, to be presented at the Naval Postgraduate 
School’s 12th Annual Acquisition Symposium, will look into the DoD’s profit policy as 
outlined in the Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR) and the Defense Federal Acquisition 
Regulations Supplement (DFARS) to determine how the DoD’s policies and practices affect 
the metrics analyzed above and, hence, the market valuation of defense firms. The aim is to 
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identify specific policy issues within the DoD’s profit and contract practices and their effect 
on defense companies’ fundamentals underlining the common market valuations. For 
example, if the government decides to pay a contractor for costs incurred by the firm 
immediately after costs were incurred, the firm will have to use a relatively small portion of 
its own capital in the process of development or production. As a result, the company’s ratio 
of free cash flow—the cash available to the firm after all expenses have been made and 
sufficient investment has been made to continue current operations—and the firm’s total 
invested capital—long- and short-term debt plus shareholders’ equity—will be higher. 
Conversely, if the government decides to pay for cost incurred (fees) only at predetermined 
milestones along the contract, the firm would have to use more of its capital in the process 
of development and production, resulting in a lower CFROI. Thus, an acquisition officer’s 
decision regarding progress payments has a direct impact on the contractor’s cash flow 
statement and, consequently, the relevant valuation multiples. 
The research team will also assess the impact of contract type and budget allocation 
(both top-line and program levels) on the market’s risk perception and its effect on the 
industry’s valuation. For example, industry watchers have argued that multiyear contracts 
could positively affect a company’s valuation by reducing the market’s risk perception 
associated with single-year contracts (McAleese, 2001). 
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Commercial Hardware & Equipment 
Electronics Manufacturing 
BENCHMARK ELEC  METHODE  PULSE 
CTS  MOLEX  RADISYS 
JABIL CIRCUIT  PARK  TRIMBLE 
MERCURY  PLEXUS  TTM 
Technology Hardware & Equipment 
ADTRAN  EMS  POLYCOM 
ARRIS  F5  QUALCOMM 
BEL FUSE  HARMONIC  RIVERBED 
BLACK BOX  HARRIS  SYMMETRICOM 
BLUE COAT  JDS UNIPHASE  TEKELEC 
CIENA  JUNIPER  TELLABS 
COMTECH  NETGEAR  VIASAT 
DG FASTCH  OPLINK 
DIGI  PLANTRONICS 
Electrical Components & Equipment 
ACUITY BRANDS  EMERSON  ROPER INDUSTRIES 
AMETEK  HUBBELL  THOMAS & BETTS 
BELDEN  REGAL‐BELOIT  WOODWARD 
BRADY  ROCKWELL 
Construction & Farm Machinery 
AGCO  JOY  TORO 
BUCYRUS  OSHKOSH  TRINITY 
CUMMINS  PACCAR  WABTEC 
DEERE  TEREX 
   
Commercial Diversified 
Services 
JABIL CIRCUIT  MANPOWER  ORACLE 
Hardware 
HONEYWELL  ITT  TEXTRON 
   
 
